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INTRODUCTION

Not long after the automobile exception was established in 1925,1
Erwin Schrödinger created a thought experiment popularly known as
Schrödinger’s Cat.2 This thought experiment, better known as the
Copenhagen Interpretation, was intended to illustrate the absurdity of
recent developments in quantum theory, as applied to real life
objects.3 Put simply, the Copenhagen Interpretation states “that a
particle exists in all states at once until observed.”4 Under this
popular theory, Schrödinger devised a scenario in which a cat could
be considered both dead and alive at the same time.5 Schrödinger
explained that this result is absurd, counterintuitive, and hopefully
“prevents us from so naively accepting as valid a ‘blurred model’ for
representing reality.”6
In 2014, the Maryland General Assembly decriminalized the
possession of less than ten grams of marijuana.7 Based on this
statute, without observing the total amount of marijuana, the
possession of marijuana exists in a superposition of two states: it is
civil and criminal in nature.8 It is only upon observation by an
officer that the nature of the offense reduces to one state: criminal or
civil, but not both.9 As we will see in the 2019 case of Pacheco v.
State, like Schrödinger’s thought experiment, the dual state of
marijuana possession resulting from Maryland’s 2014 statute is also
counterintuitive and produces absurd results.10 In effect, this statute
has further blurred the analysis of probable cause as it relates to
exceptions to the warrant requirement in an age of
decriminalization.11
*

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

J.D. Candidate, May 2021, University of Baltimore School of Law. I want to thank
everyone on the University of Baltimore Law Review for their hard work on this
paper. Thank you to Joe and Della Maher for their support throughout this process.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 15556 (1925) (establishing the automobile
exception to the Fourth Amendment prohibition on warrantless search and seizure);
see Theo Merz, Schrödinger’s Cat Explained, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 11, 2013, 11:36
PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/google-doodle/10237347/Schro
dingers-Cat-explained.html?fb [https://perma.cc/7LTC-HCPP].
Merz, supra note 1.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
214 A.3d 505, 510 (Md. 2019).
See id. at 51415 (citing Robinson v. State, 152 A.3d 661, 683 (Md. 2017)).
See id. at 51415, 517.
See infra Sections III.C, IV.B.D.
See infra Sections IV.A.B.
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In this Comment, I will argue that the complex nature of the 2014
legislation and its interaction with the exceptions to the warrant
requirement led the Court of Appeals of Maryland to decide Pacheco
v. State in a manner inconsistent with Federal and State case law.12
Furthermore, the counterintuitive nature of this statute, in which
marijuana exists in a superposition of two states, does little to further
its legislative goals, thus supporting the argument for complete
decriminalization or legalization of marijuana.13
Part II of this Comment will discuss the development and current
standard for (1) probable cause in general, (2) the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement, and (3) the search incident to
arrest exception to the warrant requirement.14
Part III will analyze Maryland’s 2014 statute which decriminalized
the possession of less than ten grams of marijuana, and recent case
law from the Court of Appeals of Maryland, which describes the
initial impact of this decriminalization statute on the former probable
cause standards and exceptions set forth in Part II.15
Part IV will first analyze the historical impact of the increasingly
complex doctrine of probable cause on Federal and State courts,
individual rights, and law enforcement.16 Part IV will then explain
why the Pacheco decision was inconsistent with prior Federal and
State case law regarding the probable cause framework and
exceptions to the warrant requirement.17 This has resulted from the
absurd and counterintuitive dual nature of possession of marijuana
under Maryland’s 2014 statute.18
Lastly, Part V of this Comment will conclude with a suggestion to
the Maryland General Assembly to completely decriminalize or
legalize the possession of marijuana.19 The 2014 statute has not
furthered goals of addressing racial disparity in police arrests and
citations, and has confused the courts enough to yield a decision
inconsistent with fundamental concepts of probable cause.20
Complete legalization or decriminalization of marijuana would help
reduce the impact of racial bias in policing, prevent the waste of
judicial resources, and ultimately provide clear guidance to law
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See infra Sections IV.B.C.
See infra Section IV.D.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Sections IV.B.C.
See infra text accompanying notes 70–74.
See infra Part V.
See infra text accompanying notes 59–68, 106–07.
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enforcement in an era of decriminalization and legalization of
marijuana.21
II. BACKGROUND: THE PROBABLE CAUSE DOCTRINE
AND THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT
REQUIREMENT
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
against unreasonable searches and seizures.22 A search that is
conducted without a warrant is considered “per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.”23 As with many bright-line rules, the
former presumption is “subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions.”24 As of now, there are many
exceptions to the warrant requirement,25 however, two are of
importance in Pacheco: (1) the automobile exception and (2) the
search incident to arrest exception.26 Before analyzing Maryland’s
2014 marijuana legislation and the legal implications of Pacheco, the
former exceptions will be reviewed in succession.27
A. The Birth of the Automobile Exception and the Current Standard
In 1925 the Supreme Court established the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement in Carroll v. United States.28 As the country
transitioned into an era of prohibition, this exception made it possible
for law enforcement to stop rum-running automobiles engaged in
illegal transportation of alcohol.29 As the doctrine evolved, “Carroll
and its progeny authorize the warrantless search of a lawfullystopped vehicle where there is probable cause to believe the vehicle
contains contraband or evidence of a crime.”30 Consequently, the

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See infra Part V and Sections III.A–.B, IV.A–.C.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
Id.
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). In his
concurring opinion, Justice Scalia noted that “[i]n 1985, one commentator cataloged
nearly 20 such exceptions [to the warrant requirement]. . . . Since then, we have added
at least two more.” Id.
214 A.3d 505, 510–12 (Md. 2019).
See infra Part II.
See 267 U.S. 132 (1925); see also Pacheco, 214 A.3d. at 510–11 (discussing origin of
the automobile exception).
See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 146.
State v. Johnson, 183 A.3d 119, 128 (Md. 2018).
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legality of a warrantless search of a vehicle is largely dependent on a
probable cause analysis.31
While the Supreme Court has restated that probable cause “is
incapable of precise definition or quantification,”32 they have insisted
that this standard be described as “practical” and “nontechnical.”33
In Robinson v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland restated
several helpful observations relating to a probable cause analysis.34
As early as the 1980s, critics feared the vast expansion of the
automobile exception pushed “[w]arrants for searches of automobiles
. . . on the verge of absolute extinction.”35 The Supreme Court
seemed to justify this expansion, as the reasons in support of the
automobile exception have also grown.36 Even prior to the former
criticism, the late Justice Burger stated, “[b]esides the element of
mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the
expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile is
significantly less than that relating to one’s home or office.”37
Additionally, “[b]ecause vehicles on the road are heavily regulated,
individuals understand that the government has some interest in the
vehicle, the condition of a vehicle’s driver, and perhaps, the contents
of the vehicle.”38 However, Courts have consistently held that the
same logic that may support a warrantless search of one’s automobile
does not necessarily support a warrantless search of that person.39

31.
32.
33.
34.

35.

36.
37.
38.

39.

See Pacheco, 214 A.3d at 511.
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003).
Id. at 370.
152 A.3d 661, 671–72, 674–79 (Md. 2017) (discussing creation of the automobile
exception and how the Maryland Court of Special Appeals and courts in other
jurisdictions have applied it within the context of marijuana decriminalization).
Lewis R. Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed: The Rise of a Public Place
Exemption to the Warrant Requirement, 36 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 375, 376–77
(1986). “By applying diverse justifications for not obtaining a warrant and shifting
justifications from case to case, the present Court exploits this ‘labyrinth of
uncertainty’ to negate constitutional restraints on police behavior.” Id. at 379
(footnotes omitted). Katz further argues that these additional justifications “are a total
betrayal of the Court’s traditional catechism that warrantless searches are per se
unreasonable.” Id. at 381.
See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391–92 (1985).
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976).
Jackie L. Starbuck, Comment, Redefining Searches Incident to Arrest: Gant’s Effect
on Chimel, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1253, 1272–73 (2012) (“The regulation of vehicles,
the fact that vehicles and their contents are often in plain view, and the public nature
of travel all contribute to the lesser sense of privacy that can be reasonably expected
in vehicles.”).
E.g., Pacheco v. State, 214 A.3d 505, 518 (Md. 2019).
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B. The Search Incident to Arrest Exception and the Heightened
Protection Afforded to One’s Person
Historically, the Supreme Court has provided “unique . . . [and]
significantly heightened protection . . . against searches of one’s
person.”40 This principle was strongly manifested in the Supreme
Court case Terry v. Ohio, as well Pacheco.41 For example, the late
Chief Justice Warren wrote the following: “Even a limited search of
the outer clothing for weapons constitutes a severe, though brief,
intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an
annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience.”42
As the name of the exception suggests, “the condition precedent to
a search incident to arrest is that police have made a lawful custodial
arrest of the person, that is, an arrest supported by probable cause that
the arrestee has committed or is committing a crime.”43 Courts must
be careful to assess whether probable cause existed prior to the
lawful arrest.44 Any facts that may be uncovered by the search of
one’s person before a lawful arrest must not be used to “bootstrap the
search itself into constitutional compliance.”45 It is important to note,
however, that Courts have held “[f]or a search to be an incident of an
arrest, it need not literally follow the arrest.”46 It is only “axiomatic
that an incident search may not precede an arrest and serve as part of
its justification.”47 In United States v. Davis, the District Court of
New York expanded on this concept:
A search incident to arrest need not necessarily occur after
formal arrest to be valid, but the argument that the search
was incident to arrest becomes more strained when the facts
show that a defendant would not have been arrested but for
the fact that the search produced evidence of a crime[.]48

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999).
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1968); see Pacheco, 214 A.3d at 518.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 24–25.
Pacheco, 214 A.3d at 512 (citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 369–70 (2003)).
Id. (“[T]he first question to be considered whenever such a search has been conducted
is whether the police had the requisite probable cause before conducting the search.”).
See Joshua Deahl, Debunking Pre-Arrest Incident Searches, 106 CAL. L. REV. 1061,
1064 (2018).
State v. Funkhouser, 782 A.2d 387, 407 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001).
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968)).
111 F. Supp. 3d 323, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). Similarly, in United States v. Wilson, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held, “[o]nce probable cause
was established, it is irrelevant whether the officers’ searches of [the defendant]
occurred prior or subsequent to his arrest.” 94 F. App’x 14, 17 (2d Cir. 2004).
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Overall, compared to the automobile exception, the probable cause
standard remains the same, however, the standard is applied to
“somewhat different facts and circumstances[.]”49 Generally, in
context of a search incident to arrest, the focus should be on the
“likelihood of the ‘guilt of the arrestee,’”50 while considering the
“factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”51
III. PRINCIPLE CASES: MARYLAND LEGISLATION AND
CASE LAW
A. The History, Goals, and Effect of Maryland’s 2014
Decriminalization Statute
In 2010, “Maryland [had] one of the highest arrest rates for
marijuana possession in the country - it [was] fourth in the nation.”52
Arrests for drug possession offenses totaled 38,179.53 Arrests for
possession of marijuana, in any amount, constituted about sixty-one
percent of all drug possession arrests, or a total of 23,552 in 2010.54
Of these arrests, “whites were arrested at a rate of less than three per
1,000, while blacks were arrested at a rate of roughly eight per

49.

Pacheco, 214 A.3d at 513. In United States v. Humphries, the Fourth Circuit stated
that in the context of arrest, “the question is whether the totality of the circumstances
indicate to a reasonable person that a ‘suspect has committed, is committing, or is
about to commit’ a crime[,]” and not just whether “contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place.” 372 F.3d 653, 659 (4th Cir. 2004). Furthermore,
Pacheco quotes language from Humphries which elaborates on this distinction:
In the search context, the question is whether the totality of
circumstances is sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to
believe that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place. Whereas in the arrest context, the question is
whether the totality of the circumstances indicate to a reasonable
person that a “suspect has committed, is committing, or is about
to commit” a crime.

50.
51.
52.

53.
54.

Pacheco, 214 A.3d at 513.
Pacheco, 214 A.3d at 513 (citation omitted).
Id. at 512 (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003)).
ACLU Report on Racial Disparities in Marijuana Arrests, ACLU MARYLAND (June 4,
2013), https://www.aclu-md.org/en/press-releases/aclu-report-racial-disparities-mariju
ana-arrests [https://perma.cc/K5ZS-VH2K].
Crime Data Explorer: Maryland, FBI, https://crime-data-explorer.fr.cloud.gov/explor
er/state/maryland/arrest [https://perma.cc/5JCD-SEUH] (last visited Mar. 30, 2021).
See id.
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1,000[,]”55 despite comparable usage rates between whites and
blacks.56 State and local governments’ aggressive enforcement of
laws criminalizing marijuana disproportionately impacted Black
people and their communities.57 For example, in 2010, Maryland had
the ninth highest rate of spending on such enforcement in the U.S.,
totaling $106 million.58
In 2014, the Maryland General Assembly decriminalized the
possession of fewer than ten grams of marijuana.59 Drafters of this
legislation intended to address “concerns over the disproportionate
number of African-Americans arrested for marijuana,”60 noting that
the disproportionate arrest rate raised serious concerns of civil rights
violations.61
The 2014 statute is a step in the right direction toward these goals.
However, it does not do enough to achieve them.62

55.
56.
57.

58.

59.
60.

61.

62.

ACLU Report on Racial Disparities in Marijuana Arrests, supra note 52.
Id.
EZEKIEL EDWARDS ET AL., THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE: BILLIONS
OF DOLLARS WASTED ON RACIALLY BIASED ARRESTS 9 (2013), https://www.aclu.
org/sites/default/files/field_document/1114413-mj-report-rfs-rel1.pdf [https://perma.
cc/PE6M-HMN9].
In Maryland, Black People Found to Be 3 Times More Likely to Be Arrested for
Marijuana Possession than White People, Despite Equal Usage Rates, ACLU (June
4, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/maryland-black-people-found-be-3-tim
es-more-likely-be-arrested-marijuana-possession?quicktabs_content_video_podcasts=
1&redirect=criminal-law-reform/maryland-black-people-found-be-3-times-more-likel
y-be-arrested-marijuana [https://perma.cc/8NEP-3AH5].
S.B. 364, 434th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2014).
Pacheco v. State, 214 A.3d 505, 514 (Md. 2019).
Furthermore, “[t]he
decriminalization was an effort to reduce the considerable time and resources spent on
arresting, prosecuting, and adjudicating marijuana cases.” Id.
Fredrick Kunkle & John Wagner, Maryland Gov. O’Malley Will Sign Marijuana
Decriminalization Bill, He Says, WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2014), https://www.washington
post.com/local/md-politics/maryland-gov-omalley-will-sign-marijuana-decriminalizat
ion-bill-senior-aide-says/2014/04/07/d50ec44c-be8f-11e3-bcec-b71ee10e9bc3_story.
html [https://perma.cc/R24C-XPFC].
See generally, e.g., Balt. Sun Editorial Board, More Blacks Still Arrested for
Marijuana Charges, BALT. SUN (Jan. 3, 2019, 1:15 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.
com/opinion/editorial/bs-ed-0103-african-americans-marijuana-arrests-20190102-stor
y.html [https://perma.cc/95VS-HA39].
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Figure 1
Figure 163 shows a decrease in total arrests for possession of
marijuana following passage of the 2014 legislation.64 However,
racial disparities in arrests for marijuana possession did not change,
and arrests overall ultimately increased before leveling out. For
example, “[i]n the first three years after the law was instituted,
Baltimore police arrested 1,448 adults and 66 juveniles for
possession . . . . Of those, 1,450 – 96 percent – were black.”65
Overall, the arrest rates for marijuana possession in Maryland
remained below their pre-2014 levels.66 However, a racially
disproportionate rate of citations for cannabis possession took the
place of such arrests.67 One news website noted that, since 2014,
Baltimore Police have issued an increasing number of cannabis
citations each year, “from 44 in 2015 to 200 in 2016 to 429 in
2017.”68
In the statute, the meaning of “decriminalization” is ambiguous.69
Under the statute, the possession of marijuanain any

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

68.
69.

Crime Data Explorer: Maryland, supra note 53.
Balt. Sun Editorial Board, supra note 62.
Id.
Crime Data Explorer: Maryland, supra note 53.
See Monique Judge, Marijuana Decriminalization in Maryland Has Not Stopped
Implicit Bias nor Institutional Racism Against Black People, THE ROOT (Jan. 2, 2019,
2:57 PM), https://www.theroot.com/marijuana-decriminalization-in-maryland-has-not
-stopped-1831437660 [https://perma.cc/9L3S-ALEQ].
Id.
See Robinson v. State, 152 A.3d 661, 680 (Md. 2017) (discussing the impact of the
decriminalization statute on the legality of marijuana possession).
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amountremains illegal.70 However, the possession of less than ten
grams of marijuana no longer constitutes a criminal offense.71
Instead, individuals possessing this amount will receive a civil
citation.72 As discussed in Part IV of this Comment, the interaction
between the probable cause doctrine, the exceptions to the warrant
requirement, and the 2014 criminal versus civil distinction is another
challenge courts must consider,73 and one that is relevant in
Pacheco.74
B. Deeper Dive into the Civil or Criminal Nature of Marijuana in
Robinson v. State
Prior to Robinson v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland had
“not yet addressed the impact of the decriminalization of possession
of less than ten grams of marijuana on an analysis of probable
cause.”75 However, the Robinson Court was guided by the legislative
intent behind the statute.76 For example, they noted the following:
In short, the statute’s plain language and legislative history
demonstrate that the General Assembly, in decriminalizing
the possession of small amounts of marijuana, did not intend
to otherwise alter existing case law concerning the search,
seizure, and forfeiture of marijuana, which remains illegal.77
Therefore, the probable cause standard was unaffected; however, it
remained unclear how the underlying circumstances, more
specifically the civil versus criminal nature of marijuana, would
impact the former analysis.78
The facts presented in Robinson are straightforward: while driving,
Officer Steven Vinias detected a strong odor of marijuana coming
from Jermaul Robinson’s vehicle.79 Robinson was leaning against
70.
71.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 680.
Id.; see also Jenna Johnson, Having a Small Amount of Pot in Md. Is No Longer a
Criminal Case, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
md-politics/pot-decriminalization--for-small-amounts--takes-effect-in-maryland-on-w
ednesday/2014/09/30/bc379534-48a5-11e4-891d-713f052086a0_story.html [https://
perma.cc/8DBL-85BM].
Robinson, 152 A.3d at 680.
See infra Sections IV.A, .D.
See infra Section III.C.
152 A.3d at 674.
See id. at 681.
Id.
See id. at 663.
Id. at 665.
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his vehicle and it was the only vehicle on that side of the street.80
Officer Vinias testified that the smell of marijuana was clearly
coming from the vehicle.81 A subsequent search of Robinson’s
vehicle uncovered more than ten grams of marijuana.82 Robinson
argued, in part, that because the 2014 legislation considered less than
ten grams of marijuana a civil offense, the mere odor of marijuana
does not give rise to probable cause that Robinson was in possession
of a criminal amount.83
As previously stated, the Court of Appeals of Maryland began their
analysis by reviewing the legislative intent and history of the
decriminalization statute.84
Although the 2014 legislation
decriminalized the possession of the lesser amount of marijuana, any
amount of marijuana remained contraband and illegal to possess.85
While refusing to accept Robinson’s argument, the Court repeatedly
stated, “[d]ecriminalization is not the same as legalization.”86 The
Robinson Court did not solely rely on the legislative intent in making
its decision.87 Instead, the Court discussed basic Fourth Amendment
case law88—i.e., where an officer has probable cause to believe that a
lawfully stopped vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime,
they may conduct a warrantless search of that vehicle.89 It follows
that “a warrantless search of a vehicle is permissible upon detection
of the odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle.”90 Essentially,
Robinson concludes that the odor of marijuana coming from a vehicle
means there is a fair probability that the defendant has marijuana in
the vehicle, regardless of whether the officer believed the amount
only constituted a civil violation.91
Furthermore, Robinson also states that “[t]he [mere] odor of
marijuana emanating from a vehicle may be just as indicative of
crimes [that involve an amount greater than ten grams.]”92 The Court
lists three crimes as an example: “possession of ten grams or more of
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 669.
See id. at 672–73.
Id. at 680.
Id.
See generally id. at 670–72 (discussing the basic concepts of probable cause and the
exceptions to the warrant requirement).
See id.
Id. at 687.
Id. at 681.
See id.
Id. at 685.
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marijuana, crimes involving the distribution of marijuana, and
driving under the influence of a controlled and dangerous
substance.”93
C. Pacheco v. State
In Pacheco, the Court of Appeals of Maryland took Robinson a
step further by determining the impact of this legislation on the
search incident to arrest exception.94 The facts presented in Pacheco
are again quite simple95: two officers were conducting a routine foot
patrol late at night in Wheaton, Maryland.96 The officers spotted a
“suspicious vehicle” parked behind a business with the windows
down.97 As they both approached the vehicle, the officers could see
that Mr. Pacheco was alone in the driver’s seat.98 One officer
testified “that he was ‘within a foot’ of the vehicle when he smelled
the odor of ‘fresh burnt’ marijuana.”99 Furthermore, that same
officer observed a marijuana cigarette in the center console, “which
he testified he knew immediately was less than ten grams.”100 Mr.
Pacheco exited the vehicle, and a search of his person uncovered
cocaine in his pocket.101
Mr. Pacheco concedes that the warrantless search of his vehicle
was constitutional.102 The search of Mr. Pacheco’s vehicle is a
straightforward application of the rule established in Robinson103: the
mere odor of marijuana coming from a vehicle authorizes a
warrantless search thereof.104 However, Mr. Pacheco successfully
argued that the “officers’ warrantless search of his person was illegal
because, at the time of the search, the officers lacked probable cause
to believe that he possessed ten grams or more of marijuana.”105

93.
94.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
See 214 A.3d 505, 513 (Md. 2019) (“An arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion
upon individual freedom . . . and the interests [it] is designed to serve are likewise
quite different.” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25 (1968))).
See id. at 508–09.
Id. at 508.
Id.
Id. at 508–09.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 509.
Id.
Id. at 516.
See id.
Id. (“[T]he eventual search of Mr. Pacheco’s vehicle was permissible by application
of the automobile doctrine.”).
Id. at 509, 517–18.
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In other words, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the
odor of fresh burnt marijuana and the presence of a marijuana
cigarette, the amount of which constituted a civil violation, does not
give rise to a “fair probability” that Mr. Pacheco possessed marijuana
that would amount to a criminal violation.106 As discussed in a later
part of this Comment, this decision is inconsistent with Federal and
State probable cause case law, and if left unaddressed, will continue
to frustrate lower courts and law enforcement with a greater degree
of uncertainty.107
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Historical and Current Impact of the Probable Cause Doctrine
on Federal and State Courts, Law Enforcement, and Individual
Rights
The never-ending puzzle of exceptions to the warrant requirement
is one that has been passed down for generations in the courts.108 In
California v. Acevedo, the late Justice Scalia stated:
The victory was illusory. Even before today’s decision, the
“warrant requirement” had become so riddled with
exceptions that it was basically unrecognizable. In 1985,
one commentator cataloged nearly 20 such exceptions . . . .
[T]herefore, I do not regard today’s holding as some
momentous departure, but rather as merely the continuation
of an inconsistent jurisprudence that has been with us for
years.109
Justice Scalia is one of many Supreme Court Justices to voice their
opinion on this subject.110 Some have argued that this area of

106. Id. at 518.
107. See infra Section IV.D.
108. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 568–69 (1991) (“[T]he law applicable to a
closed container in an automobile . . . has troubled courts and law enforcement
officers since it was first considered in [United States v.] Chadwick[, 433 U.S. 1
(1977)].”).
109. Id. at 582–83 (Scalia, J., concurring).
110. See infra notes 111–19 and accompanying text. Justice Rehnquist also stated, “While
these general principles are easily stated, the decisions of this Court dealing with the
constitutionality of warrantless searches, especially when those searches are of
vehicles, suggest that this branch of the law is something less than a seamless web.”
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973).
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inconsistent jurisprudence has exhausted judicial resources.111
“Although litigation is important in creating case law, repeated
litigation with inconsistent results throws our system into
confusion.”112 In United States v. Robinson, Justice Rehnquist
seemed to express frustration about the constant litigation and “caseby-case adjudication” of these issues.113 However, standing as a
guard against all things that could resemble a bright-line rule, the
dissenting opinion characterized Justice Rehnquist’s belief as a
selfish one.114 For example, Justice Marshall stated:
“There is no formula for the determination of
reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts
and circumstances.” . . . And the intensive, at times
painstaking, case-by-case analysis characteristic of our
Fourth Amendment decisions bespeaks our “jealous regard
for maintaining the integrity of individual rights.”115
If we are to accept that such bright-line rules have no place within the
doctrine of probable cause and the exceptions to the warrant
requirement,116 then courts must do their best to simplify this
seemingly complex area of law.
The confusing and dense nature of probable cause has not only
troubled courts for decades, but it has also impacted law
enforcement.117 This impact can be simply stated as follows:
“Uncertainty about the constitutionality of a warrantless search may
lead police either to forego a legitimate search or to violate an

111. See Starbuck, supra note 38, at 1255 (“When lower courts split on how to properly
apply precedent, it is the Supreme Court that must step in to settle the dispute. The
Supreme Court has failed to mend the split of authority over the applicability of the
vehicle cases to other searches incident to arrest. This failure has caused the
protections of the Fourth Amendment to vary by jurisdiction and has wasted judicial
resources.”) (footnotes omitted).
112. Id. at 1266.
113. See 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
114. See id. at 238 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
115. Id.
116. The dissent goes on to state, “The majority’s attempt to avoid case-by-case
adjudication of Fourth Amendment issues is not only misguided as a matter of
principle, but is also doomed to fail as a matter of practical application.” Id. at 248.
Additionally, “bright-line” rules have been characterized as “unnecessary,
unsuccessful, and an infringement on privacy interests.” Steven D. Clymer, Note,
Warrantless Vehicle Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Burger Court Attacks
the Exclusionary Rule, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 138 (1982).
117. See Clymer, supra note 116, at 106.
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individual’s privacy rights.”118 As previously mentioned, the degree
of uncertainty has been tremendous in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, which will continue to impact law enforcement and
decisions made by lower courts.119
In Acevedo, Justice Stevens recognized the importance of
providing “clear and unequivocal” guidelines to law enforcement,
however, he argued “that the decisions of this Court evince a lack of
confusion about the automobile exception.”120 Furthermore, Justice
Stevens reasoned “that law enforcement has not been impeded
because the Court has decided 29 Fourth Amendment cases since
[1982] in favor of the government.”121 Justice Blackmun quickly
disputed Justice Stevens’ argument by noting the following:
The dissent fails to explain how the loss of 29 cases below,
not to mention the many others which this Court did not
hear, did not interfere with law enforcement. The fact that
the state courts and the Federal Courts of Appeals have been
reversed in their Fourth Amendment holdings 29 times since
1982 further demonstrates the extent to which our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has confused the courts.122
The statistics presented by Justice Blackmun not only show the
impact of this issue on law enforcement, but also how it has affected
Federal and State courts.123 “[C]onfusion of the law breeds litigation,
and the constant re-litigation of the same issues wastes judicial
resources.”124
As legislation surrounding marijuana becomes more detailed and
complex, disagreements about the law of probable cause and the
application of exceptions to the warrant requirement are inevitable.125

118. Id. In Acevedo, the Court states that another exception to the warrant requirement,
referred to as the Chadwick-Sanders rule, “is the antithesis of a clear and unequivocal
guideline and, thus, has confused courts and police officers and impeded effective law
enforcement.” 500 U.S. 565, 566 (1991) (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696
(1983) (citations omitted)).
The Chadwick-Sanders rule provides that law
enforcement may search a bag within a vehicle when there is probable cause to search
the entire vehicle. Id. at 565–66.
119. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 576–77.
120. Id. at 577.
121. Id. at 578.
122. Id. (illustrating the Court’s continuous struggle with how to apply the automobile
exception and its impact on lower courts and law enforcement).
123. See id.
124. Starbuck, supra note 38, at 1267.
125. See id. at 1270–71.

502

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

B. The Court of Appeals of Maryland Did Not Adequately
Distinguish Pacheco from Robinson
Following the Robinson v. State decision, Pacheco affirmed the
holding that the mere odor of marijuana coming from a vehicle gives
rise to a fair probability that the vehicle contains a civil or criminal
amount of marijuana.126 However, Pacheco went on to hold that the
odor plus the actual presence of less than ten grams of marijuana,
does not give rise to a fair probability that the defendant is in
possession of a criminal amount.127
First, the Court in Pacheco made it clear that it gave little weight to
the actual discovery of marijuana, rather than the mere odor, in
determining whether officers had probable cause for a warrantless
arrest and search incident thereof.128 For example, the Court
repeatedly stated: “little else was presented that addressed why this
minimal amount of marijuana, which is not a misdemeanor, . . . gave
rise to a fair probability that Mr. Pacheco possessed a criminal
amount . . . .”129 By failing to give weight to the additional evidence,
the Court’s decision yields a result inconsistent with the probable
cause standard only requiring a fair probability of criminal activity to
support a lawful warrantless arrest and search incident to that
arrest.130
As previously mentioned, the Court in Pacheco heavily relied on
the following premise in support of their holding: “The same facts
and circumstances that justify a search of an automobile do not
necessarily justify an arrest and search incident thereto.”131 The
former premise can be restated with the facts in Pacheco: the mere
odor of marijuana that would justify a search of an automobile does
not necessarily justify a lawful warrantless arrest and search incident
to that arrest.132
However, in Pacheco, the State was not attempting to justify a
search incident to arrest solely on the facts used in support of the
automobile exception.133 In addition to the mere odor of marijuana,
the officers discovered a freshly burnt marijuana joint in the center

126. See Pacheco v. State, 214 A.3d 505, 516 (Md. 2019).
127. See id. at 518.
128. See id. at 517–18 (“In a different case, additional facts or testimony beyond what we
have here may well have compelled a different result.”).
129. Id. at 518.
130. See infra notes 131–53 and accompanying text.
131. 214 A.3d at 518.
132. See id. at 515–18.
133. See id.
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console of Pacheco’s car.134 Strangely, the Court seems to give no
weight to the additional circumstances that should arguably support a
warrantless search incident to Mr. Pacheco’s arrest.135 Furthermore,
these additional circumstances overcome the legal barrier of the
defendant’s “significantly heightened” expectation of privacy to be
secure in their body and distinguish Pacheco from Robinson.136
Although the Court of Appeals is not bound by a lower court’s
decision and analysis, in Barrett v. State, the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland correctly answered the question presented in
Pacheco while remaining consistent with Federal and State probable
cause case law.137
Barrett took place post-2014 legislation and pre-Pacheco.138
Additionally, the facts in Barrett are very similar to those in
Pacheco.139 In November 2014, Detective Brian Salmon (Salmon)
saw a vehicle with a large crack along the front windshield.140 This
prompted Salmon to approach the defendant’s vehicle.141 When
Salmon and another officer passed the vehicle, “they ‘immediately
smelled the strong odor of marijuana.’”142 Following a lawful stop of
the vehicle, the other officer “approached the passenger side of the
vehicle and asked [Barrett] . . . if there was any marijuana in the
car.”143 The passenger “‘freely stated that they were smoking
marijuana’ . . . and he handed [the officer] ‘a brown hand-rolled cigar
containing green plant material.’”144 After asking the passenger to
exit the vehicle, Salmon searched the passenger’s person and
recovered a “9–millimeter handgun from [his] pants.”145
Not only are the facts in Barrett strikingly similar to those in
Pacheco, the overall issues and arguments raised by the defendants

134. Id. at 517.
135. Id. at 517–18.
136. See id. at 513 (discussing the additional circumstances required to support a
warrantless search incident to arrest).
137. See generally 174 A.3d 441, 449–51 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017).
138. See id. at 444.
139. Compare Barrett, 174 A.3d at 444–45 (involving warrantless search of the front seat
passenger in vehicle, based on the odor of marijuana, revealing a handgun), with
Pacheco, 214 A.3d at 508–09 (involving warrantless search of the front seat
passenger in vehicle, based on the odor of marijuana, revealing cocaine).
140. Barrett, 174 A.3d at 444.
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 445
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are identical.146 For example, the Court in Barrett states following:
“Defense counsel argued that appellant’s ‘admittance of [a] civil
offense’ of possession of less than ten grams of marijuana ‘does not
give rise to [] probable cause of criminal activity.’”147 However, the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland disagreed with the defense.148
Persuaded by the additional circumstances with the odor of
marijuana, the Barrett court stated:
This case, however, does not involve the mere odor of
marijuana. Here, not only did the officers smell marijuana in
a vehicle[,] . . . when [the passenger] was asked if there was
marijuana in the car, he “freely admitted” that “they” had
been smoking marijuana, and he handed [the officers] a
cigar.149
Therefore, the Barrett court concluded that “[i]n situations where the
police have more information connecting an occupant of a vehicle to
the marijuana, and there is more than merely the odor of marijuana,
courts have found probable cause to arrest.”150 “The Court of
Appeals noted that other jurisdictions that had addressed the issue
had determined that, even though possession of a small amount of
marijuana had been decriminalized, it still suggested criminal
activity.”151
The court’s decision in Barrett is consistent with the Supreme
Court’s framework in Maryland v. Pringle, and Maryland’s new
framework established in Robinson v. State.152 Based on Pringle,
“[w]e note that probable cause does not require evidence sufficient to
146. Compare Barrett, 174 A.3d at 450 (“[Defendant] argues that, because the police could
not tell the quantity of the marijuana involved, the police did not have probable cause
to believe that he was committing a crime.”), with Pacheco v. State, 214 A.3d 505,
509 (Md. 2019) (arguing that the minimal amount of marijuana discovered in Mr.
Pacheco’s vehicle did not give police probable cause to believe he was committing a
crime). Although the search incident to arrest determination was not decided by the
circuit court, “‘an appellee is entitled to assert any ground adequately shown by the
record for upholding the trial court’s decision, even if the ground was not raised in the
trial court,’ and ‘if legally correct, the trial court’s decision will be affirmed on such
alternative ground.’” Barrett, 174 A.3d at 448 (quoting Unger v. State, 48 A.3d 242,
245 (Md. 2012)).
147. Barrett, 174 A.3d at 445 (alterations in original).
148. See id. at 452.
149. Id. at 449.
150. Id. at 449–50 (citing United States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 659 (4th Cir. 2004)).
151. Id. at 450 (citing Robinson v. State, 152 A.3d 661, 678–79 (Md. 2017) (citation
omitted)).
152. See infra notes 153–54 and accompanying text.
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convictonly that which would lead a reasonable inference of
guilt.”153 Therefore, “[a] requirement that the police need to be
absolutely sure that the amount of marijuana involved is more than
9.99 grams before they have probable cause to arrest is inconsistent
with the concept of probable cause.”154
C. By Failing to View the Facts from the Officers’ Perspective, the
Result in Pacheco Is Inconsistent with the Framework Set Forth
in Pringle
The Pacheco Court failed to analyze and review the facts leading
up to the arrest from the perspective of an objectively reasonable
police officer, as required by key precedent.155 This has resulted in a
conclusion that is inconsistent with the standards set forth in Pringle
and Brinegar v. United States.156
Pringle restates the well-known standard that when a court
analyzes an issue of probable cause, they must only look to the facts
known to the officer leading up to the arrest.157 Additionally, these
facts will be “viewed from the standpoint of an objectively
reasonable police officer.”158 “These long-prevailing standards seek
to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable inferences . . . .”159
“They also seek to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the
community’s protection.”160 Because probable cause deals with
probabilities, “‘the quanta . . . of proof’ appropriate in ordinary
judicial proceedings are inapplicable to the decision to issue a
warrant.”161
In Pacheco, the facts only indicate that the officers immediately
knew the marijuana joint “was less than ten grams.”162 They had no
knowledge of the exact amount leading up to the arrest.163 However,
in support of their analysis, the Pacheco Court assumes the officers
had precise knowledge of the amount of marijuana as they conducted
153. Nebraska v. Perry, 874 N.W.2d 36, 47 (Neb. 2016).
154. Barrett, 174 A.3d at 452 (quoting Moulden v. State, 69 A.3d 36, 44 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2013)).
155. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 696 (1996)).
156. See infra notes 157–80 and accompanying text.
157. See Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371.
158. Id. (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696).
159. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
160. Id.
161. See Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371 (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 173).
162. See Pacheco v. State, 214 A.3d 505, 509 (Md. 2019).
163. See id. at 517.
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a search for more on Mr. Pacheo’s person.164 For example, after the
fact, the Court had the privilege to reference How Much Weed is in a
Joint? Pot Experts Have a New Estimate.165 Thereafter, the Court
used this lower extreme value to hold that the officers could not
reasonably infer that Mr. Pacheco had the additional nine and a half
grams to constitute a criminal offense.166
Using this data ex post facto, the Court asserts a degree of certainty
into the probable cause analysis, which the officers did not have
leading up to the arrest of Mr. Pacheco.167 This leads to a result
inconsistent with that of a reasonable police officer standard.168 On
its face this may seem insignificant, however, it is important to
understand the change in circumstances, point-of-view, and practical
differences between judges and law enforcement169:
A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of
ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle
nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady
stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges
easily feed, but they may be “literally impossible of
application by the officer in the field.”170
Although not discussed in Pacheco, it is important to address the
effect of mistake of fact by an officer on the validity of an arrest.171
In other words, does a mistake of fact, which was assumed by the
164. See id.
165. Id. at 517 n.8 (citing Niraj Chikshi, How Much Weed Is in a Joint? Pot Experts Have
a New Estimate, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/sc
ience/how-much-weed-is-in-a-joint-pot-experts-have-a-new-estimate.html [https://per
ma.cc/MLH2-M9JX]).
166. See id. at 517. The Court reasoned the officers did not testify that the circumstances
“supported an inference that Mr. Pacheco also possessed roughly nine and a half more
grams of that substance on his person.” Id.
167. See id. (stating that the officers only knew the marijuana joint “clearly contained less
than ten grams of marijuana”).
168. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172–73 (“Apart from its failure to take
account of the facts disclosed by [the officer’s] direct and personal observation, . . .
the so-called distinction places a wholly unwarranted emphasis upon the criterion of
admissibility in evidence.”).
169. See id. at 173.
170. Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-by-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized
Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 141 (1974) (quoting
United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wilkey, J.,
dissenting), rev’d, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)).
171. See Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176 (“Because many situations which confront officers in
the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be
allowed for some mistakes on their part.”).
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officer in support of their arrest, automatically make that warrantless
arrest invalid or unlawful?172 The short answer is no.173 From an
officer’s perspective, “room must be allowed for some mistakes on
their part[,] [b]ut the mistakes must be those of reasonable men,
acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of
probability.”174 As Justice Rutledge explained the concept in
Brinegar:
The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical
conception affording the best compromise that has been
found for accommodating these often opposing interests.
Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To
allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the
mercy of the officers’ whim or caprice.175
The officers in Pacheco “were quite wrong as it turned out, . . .
[b]ut sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of
reasonableness,” as stated in Hill v. California.176 Therefore, a
reasonable mistake of fact which armed the officer with probable
cause that Mr. Pacheco was committing a crime means the arrest is
considered unlawful.177 To hold otherwise would significantly
“hamper law enforcement”178 and would further disregard “the
difference between [what] is required to prove guilt in a criminal case
and what is required to show probable cause for arrest or search.”179
“There is a large difference between the two things to be proved, as
well as between the tribunals which determine them, and therefore a
like difference in the quanta and modes of proof required to establish
them.”180
D. Pacheco Inconsistent with the Legislative Intent of 2014
Marijuana Statute
The decision in Pacheco is inconsistent with the legislative intent
of the 2014 decriminalization statute.181 In Robinson v. State, the
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See id. (describing the impact of mistake of fact on a probable cause analysis).
See id.
Id.
Id.
401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971); see also Pacheco v. State, 214 A.3d 505, 508–09 (Md.
2019).
See Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176.
Id.
Id. at 172–73.
Id.
See infra notes 184–88 and accompanying text.
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Court notes the following: “[T]he statute’s plain language and
legislative history demonstrate that the General Assembly, in
decriminalizing possession of small amounts of marijuana, did not
intend to otherwise alter existing case law concerning the search,
seizure, and forfeiture of marijuana, which remains illegal.”182
The Court’s decision in Robinson v. State is consistent with the
However, the Court in Pacheco seems
legislative intent.183
encouraged to treat the civil nature of less than ten grams of
marijuana differently in their probable cause analysis.184 “On April
5, 2014, the House Judiciary Committee adopted an amendment to
address this issue.”185 “This amendment added the [] language
regarding seizure and forfeiture . . . .”186 Furthermore, Senator
Robert Zirkin (D-Md.), a supporter of the bill, “testified that ‘[t]he
intention of this bill is not to stop what would be right now a lawful
search incident to arrest.’”187 This legislative history stands in
contrast with the holding in Pacheco.188
V. CONCLUSION
In 2014, Maryland decriminalized the possession of less than ten
grams of marijuana.189 The possession of less than ten grams became
a civil offense; however, the possession of ten grams or more
remained a criminal offense.190 The statute had many goals191: (1) to
prevent police and prosecutors from wasting their “attention on what
is increasingly viewed by the public as a relatively harmless vice”;
(2) reduce the use of judicial resources on these matters; and more
importantly (3) address concerns of “racial disparities in marijuana
possession arrests between blacks and whites despite equivalent rates
of use.”192
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

189.
190.
191.

192.

Robinson v. State, 152 A.3d 661, 681 (Md. 2017).
See id. at 680–81.
See generally Pacheco v. State, 214 A.3d 505, 517–18 (Md. 2019).
Robinson, 152 A.3d at 681.
Id.
Id.
Compare Robinson, 152 A.3d at 681 (stating that the 2014 legislation was not meant
to alter a search incident to arrest analysis), with Pacheco, 214 A.3d at 517–18
(holding that a civil amount of marijuana does not necessarily give rise to probable
cause in support of a warrantless search of that person).
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.
Fixing Md.’s Marijuana Law [Editorial], BALT. SUN (Oct. 3, 2014, 12:40 PM),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/editorial/bs-ed-marijuana-decriminalization-2
0141005-story.html [https://perma.cc/L25V-H3W9].
Id.
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland was quickly presented with two
cases that would determine the impact of this 2014 legislation on a
probable cause analysis: Robinson v. State and Pacheco v. State.193
Pacheco ultimately held that the odor of marijuana gives rise to
probable cause for a warrantless search of a vehicle; however, the
odor plus the actual discovery of less than ten grams of marijuana in
a vehicle does not give rise to probable cause or support a reasonable
probability that the defendant is in possession of ten grams or
more.194
Even before the era of legalization and decriminalization of
marijuana, “the Fourth Amendment has always been a deadly serious
gamble”195 generated by decades of uncertainty and confusion
surrounding the exceptions to the warrant requirement.196 The Court
of Appeals of Maryland’s decision in Pacheco v. State shows us how
the counterintuitive nature of a partial-decriminalization statute
causes absurd results in courts and further complicates the ongoing
puzzle of probable cause.197
The Supreme Court “has overruled . . . prior case[s] [regarding the
scope of the probable cause doctrine] on the comparatively rare
occasion when it has bred confusion or been a derelict or led to
anomalous results.”198 By legalizing or completely decriminalizing
the possession of marijuana, Maryland courts would be able to avoid
the future struggle and confusion of how Maryland’s 2014 statute
would impact a probable cause analysis.199 More importantly, this
would further the goals set out by the 2014 legislation.200

193. See supra Sections III.B–.C.
194. 214 A.3d 505, 518 (Md. 2019).
195. Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: The Odds on Probable Cause, 74 MISS.
L.J. 279, 279 (2004).
196. See supra Section IV.A.
197. See supra Section IV.D.
198. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (1991).
199. See supra Part IV.
200. See supra notes 189–92 and accompanying text.
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